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Abstract
Security awareness and education programmes are rolled
out in more and more organisations. However, their effective-
ness over time and, correspondingly, appropriate intervals to
remind users’ awareness and knowledge are an open ques-
tion. In an attempt to address this open question, we present a
field investigation in a German organisation from the public
administration sector. With overall 409 employees, we eval-
uated (a) the effectiveness of their newly deployed security
awareness and education programme in the phishing context
over time and (b) the effectiveness of four different reminder
measures – administered after the initial effect had worn off to
a degree that no significant improvement to before its deploy-
ment was detected anymore. We find a significantly improved
performance of correctly identifying phishing and legitimate
emails directly after and four months after the programme’s
deployment. This was not the case anymore after six months,
indicating that reminding users after half a year is recom-
mended. The investigation of the reminder measures indicates
that measures based on videos and interactive examples per-
form best, lasting for at least another six months.
1 Introduction
Maintaining information security is an important challenge
for organisations, and also for governmental and public admin-
istration sectors. The so-called German national IT Planning
Council [71] requires German organisations in the public
administration sector to implement information security man-
agement systems (ISMS). One of the goals of such ISMSs
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is to enhance employees’ information security awareness
and knowledge. A common approach to satisfying this re-
quirement is to roll out security awareness and education
programmes. They typically raise general security awareness
(e.g., everyone can potentially become a victim, the techno-
logical protection mechanisms need users’ support, potential
consequences of successful attacks) and convey knowledge
about information security (including how to identify vari-
ous attacks, how to reduce one’s risks of becoming a victim
of cyber attackers, and who shall be contacted in case of
questions and incidents). These programmes may include
security awareness and education measures that cover differ-
ent aspects and/or topics using different media types, such as
self-learning measures [63], e-learning platforms [9], on-site
tutorials [102], or games [94]. Although such measures are
widely deployed, an evaluation of their effectiveness related
to their ability to enhance employees’ information security
skills over an extended time period is often missing. This,
however, is of the essence: if employees are never, or only
rarely, confronted with attacks that are included in a security
awareness and education programme, the acquired aware-
ness and knowledge might dissipate over time, as is the case
with any other awareness and knowledge programmes. While
waning of awareness and dwindling of knowledge is to be
expected, it poses a problem to the maintenance of organisa-
tional information security. Therefore, it is crucial to know:
(a) when awareness and knowledge levels should be renewed,
i.e., how long the effect of a security awareness and educa-
tion programme can be expected to last, and (b) which type
of measures are best suited to restore users’ awareness and
knowledge.
Researchers could show the effectiveness of security aware-
ness and education measures directly after roll-out [4, 64, 94,
98, 102, 106, 111, 119] and that the significant improvements
endured over different spans of time. [22, 60, 116]. However,
what is missing, is an insight into how long the impact of
a security awareness and education measure lasts and how
awareness and knowledge should be renewed. In order to gain
these insights, we adopted and evaluated the phishing aware-
ness and education measure from [84]. We customised it for
a German organisation from the public administration sector:
a German State Office for Geoinformation and State Survey
(SOGSS). We replaced example messages with those more
suited to SOGSS and by removing irrelevant content. The con-
tent was presented face-to-face in on-site tutorials. A ‘train
the instructor’ approach was used, which involved eleven
instructors being trained by the Chief Information Security
Manager. The participation in the tutorial was mandatory for
all employees.
We evaluated employees’ skills in distinguishing phishing
emails from legitimate emails at several points in time. First,
data was collected just before and directly after the on-site
tutorials. To study how long the effect lasted, we collected
retention data four months after employees had participated
in the tutorial. We were prepared to continue doing so every
second month as long as we continued to see a significant
enhancement of participants’ skills.
Our first contribution: we systematically measured the re-
tention for the tutorial. Compared to previous studies we
measured until the significant improvement wore off plus an-
other measure after this point in time. The impact wore off
after six months.
Our second contribution: we developed suitable reminder
measures to replenish the employees’ phishing awareness
and knowledge after receiving not significant results for the
first time after the tutorial. We developed four different ones
(three presenting the content using text, one using video and
one using interactive email examples). The success of the
reminder measures was evaluated right after their deployment,
and again after six months.
Our third contribution: we accompanied an organization
for a total of twelve months to both check for the effectiveness
of the tutorial and the reminder measures. The awareness and
knowledge levels of participants having either seen the video
measure or the interactive examples after six months were still
significantly higher twelve months after the initial tutorial.
As a consequence, SOGSSs decided to use the video and
the interactive examples measures and to distribute these to
all employees on a regular basis at six month intervals.
2 Related Work
This section commences by providing phishing definitions
from the research literature. Related work is discussed next
with regard to different types of security interventions, dif-
ferent study designs used to evaluate these interventions, and
different types of tested users groups. Finally research into
the impact of phishing security awareness and education mea-
sures over time are discussed.
Phishing Definitions: there are many different definitions
of phishing in the literature. Correspondingly, researchers’
focus is different: (1) those who focus on phishers who want
their victims to provide sensitive information (e.g. passwords,
bank details) using an authentic-looking phishing web page
[1–4,7,16–19,21,22,30,33,35,38,51,54,57,58,64,68–70,75–
77, 80, 82, 88, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98, 104, 105, 108, 113–115, 117],
or (2) those who focus on phishers who distribute malware
when recipients click on links in messages or open attached
files [1,6,8,9,12–15,20,23,24,31,32,34,41,43,45,48–50,55,
56,59–62,74,79,81,85–87,90,92,99,102,103,106,107,109–
112, 116, 119]. Because it is safer to check the URL before
clicking on it, instead of only checking the URL after opening
the web page people are redirected to, we focus on the second
one.
Types of Interventions1: various studies evaluating different
types of interventions to test their effectiveness exist. Re-
searchers evaluated a range of tools that are supposed to
provide further support (e.g. additional security indicators
or displaying existing security indicators in different ways)
[2,5,18,29,36,40,66,68,69,72,88,96,114,115,117,118]. Dif-
ferent evaluated security awareness and education measures
are a range of videos [46, 107], games [10, 11, 21, 22, 64, 94],
various on-site instructor based tutorials [98, 102, 116] – as
studied in the research presented in this paper – and a mul-
titude of text-based measures [4, 47, 60, 65, 84, 92, 98, 102,
104, 110, 116, 119]. Additionally, there is research evaluat-
ing users’ skills in phishing detection without any interven-
tions [6,7,12,14,15,26,30,31,34,37,39,45,48–51,53,54,59,
73, 74, 80, 81, 85–87, 89, 90, 95, 100, 103, 109] (e.g. to under-
stand decision making, to identify a baseline, or to motivate
further research).
Study Designs: various types of lab studies have been em-
ployed, some with a cover story [4,14,15,35,36,61,69,86,91]
and others without one [7,11,37,40,98,103,116], i.e., having
security as participants’ primary goal by telling participants
the goal of the user study. A number of remote studies have
been carried out, including various types of online surveys,
with phishing messages sent to the study participants own
email accounts (not study specific) [30, 37, 40, 59, 81, 87,
102, 104], as well as to remotely accessible study-specific
accounts [88, 90, 109, 110, 119]. Surveys include those that
(1) show screenshots to be judged either as phishes or legit-
imate [54, 70, 100] as we did in our study. In some cases
real phishes were used; others used examples created by the
researchers; and (2) online surveys asking general questions
such as the definition of phishing and the existing attack
types [20, 51, 52, 79].
Types of User Groups: studies have targeted different user
groups, i.e. mixed groups on a variety of panels without de-
liberately isolating specific kinds of participants [16, 35, 40,
54, 70], employees [26, 43, 49], or university faculty or stu-
dents [6, 11, 14, 15, 31, 53, 86, 87]. Our target users were
employees of a governmental organisation.
Forgetting Rate of Different Age Groups: [44] evaluated
the ability to recall visual cues after 20-30 minutes and 75
1Interventions can be tools or security awareness and education measures.
days. They did not find any age differences in the recall abil-
ity of these visual cues. [101] examined the recall ability of
verbal cues after 1 and 62 days with different age groups.
They conclude that the encoding of the information in the
beginning is slower, but the rate of forgetting is comparable
afterwards. Retention Periods of IT-Related Training: while
most of the previously mentioned phishing studies evaluated
the impact of the their interventions straight after roll-out,
a few also evaluated the effect after some time had elapsed.
These mainly showed that the effect still held and did not sys-
tematically determine for how long the effect was still evident.
These retention studies were mainly conducted in the context
of security awareness and education measures. In [28, 60],
retention was evaluated after approximately a month. In [116],
retention was evaluated after 45 days. In [107], the retention
was evaluated after 8 weeks. In [22], retention was evaluated
after 5 months. All showed that the effect was still perceptible
but was often no longer significant. [78] examined the ability
to judge insecure password-related behaviour. The partici-
pants received awareness-raising materials and were tested
again after 6 months. The participants were able to retain
significant knowledge. In our case, we study exactly how long
the effect lasts.
3 Use Case: Organisation Description
A State Office for Geoinformation and State Survey (SOGSS)
is a public administration sector organisation. Its core activ-
ities relate to land register and real estate cadastre. Overall,
SOGSS has about 2200 employees, 83% of whom have a
technical background in either surveying, geodesy, geoinfor-
matics or other related fields, such as photogrammetry. 60%
of the employees are over 50 years of age. Only 14% are
between 25 and 35 years of age. 40% of all employees are
female, 60% are male. All employees use passwords and their
SOGSS email account on a daily basis. Email communication
with colleagues, citizens, and partners from business, science
and other authorities is indispensable to employees.
SOGSS has nine regional head offices, a central operational
office and a central head office, each with several departments
and each in a different city. Like all organisations in the Ger-
man public administration sector, SOGSS is required by the
national IT Planning Council [71] to implement an infor-
mation security management system (ISMS). Thus, SOGSS
established the position of a chief information security man-
ager (CISM) and the role of ‘person of contact for information
security concerns’ (PoC-InfoSec) was introduced as organ-
isational interface between the CISM and the local offices.
The managers of all ten human resources and administration
departments (from nine regional head offices and the central
operational office), as well as the manager of the central head
office, perform this role. Furthermore, SOGSS decided to
develop a security awareness & education programme con-
taining one mandatory on-site tutorial, which was delivered
to all employees. Most tutorial sessions were held in October
2018.
4 Security Awareness and Education Measure
We describe the design decisions made for the mandatory
measure rolled out in 2018. Afterwards, we describe their
structure and content. Finally, we introduce the reminder mea-
sures.
4.1 Design Decisions
The organisation decided to use on-site tutorials instead of
other delivery measures, such as web-based training, for two
reasons. Firstly, on-site tutorials are common practice at
SOGSS and therefore employees’ acceptance of such tutorials
was expected to be higher than for other formats. Secondly,
the search for a suitable third-party web-based training, and
the obligatory call for tenders, would have taken too long. Due
to room size constraints, it was decided to deliver training to
forty participants in each tutorial. Furthermore, based on the
experiences from other on-site tutorials, it was decided that
the tutorial should last three to four hours. Thus, the content
had to fit into this allotted time.
A decision was made to adopt a ‘train the instructor’ ap-
proach, instead of having the CISM delivering all the tutorials.
The ‘train the instructor’ approach was chosen since it rep-
resents a resource-efficient way to deliver tutorials to a large
number of employees over a reasonably short period of time.
The eleven PoC-InfoSec were trained by the CISM. To sup-
port them, a Power Point presentation was developed in two
versions: 1) an instructor version, supplemented with explana-
tions and instructions on how to facilitate audience interaction,
and 2) the actual presentation to be used during the tutorial.
4.2 Content Overview
It was decided that the tutorial would address the following
three topics, as threat reports and the organisation’s expe-
riences identified these as the most relevant ones: Topic-1:
General security awareness, Topic-2: Phishing, and Topic-3:
Password best practice. While the first and third parts were
developed by the CISM from scratch, the second part was an
adaptation of the awareness and education measure reported
by [84]. Correspondingly, the focus of our investigation was
on Topic-22. Its content will be described in more detail in
the following two subsections.
2It could be argued that we should only have addressed this one topic
in the tutorial if only one was going to be evaluated. However, this would
not have been sufficient to be compliant with the ISMS. We could indeed
have conducted two different tutorials, but this would have been much less
efficient and there might have still been a bias because the study ran over
several months and therefore everyone would have had to participate in the
second tutorial in the same period of time, too. Thus, because we wanted to
able to conduct our evaluation in the field, we had to accept this trade-off.
With respect to the content of the tutorials, Topic 1 pro-
vided a general introduction to the information security topic
and information about how security incidents have to be dealt
with in SOGSS. The organisation’s threat statistics and typical
threat vectors such as email (being one of the most common
in public administration) were introduced. Where suitable,
examples of anonymised in-house IT-security incidents were
provided to demonstrate vulnerabilities when using the In-
ternet. The content of Topic 3 made employees aware of the
risks of using weak passwords and introduced methods of
building strong passwords. This part ended with a short inter-
active quiz, where examples were used to assess the respective
password strength.
4.3 Topic 2 Content: Phishing
We customised a security awareness and education measure,
which was developed and evaluated3 by Neumann et al. [84].
This material is very well suited: it has been evaluated in
an organisational context attesting its effectiveness and it is
freely available in German. The original content was prepared
for self study use, i.e., reading a pdf or integrated it into an
e-learning platform. Thus, it needed to be customised. The
content of the measure had two parts:
Part-A provided general information about phishing, in-
cluding: (a) why everyone can potentially become a victim,
(b) that phishers don’t just use email messages but any type
of message, (c) that there are various types of phishing mes-
sages (including those asking for sensitive information, those
including dangerous links, and those with dangerous files at-
tached), (d) what the potential consequences of falling for
a phishing attack are, and (e) the recommendation to delete
phishing messages and to search for further information when
the person is uncertain.
Part-B: commenced by explaining that a number of plau-
sibility checks should be carried out, including checking the
language, the style, and the sender information. Afterwards,
the focus was on phishing messages which look plausible,
at first glance, but which actually contain potentially danger-
ous links and/or attached files. Legitimate messages might be
used as template, with the sender address being spoofed, and
the URL behind a link and/or the attachment being replaced.
First, employees were shown how to check whether an em-
bedded link was dangerous to click on. This covers several
attack types that phishers use to trick people (for more infor-
mation see Appendix B). Furthermore, it was explained that
these tricks are combined by phishers and that the presence of
https is an unreliable indicator of trustworthiness. Second,
they were shown how to identify dangerous file(s) and told
which tricks phishers apply to trick people, incl. using two
file extensions or unknown extensions.
3Note that effectiveness was evaluated straight after rolling-out the mea-
sure.
Both parts contained several example messages. All exam-
ples were synthetic as we came up with our own brands. There
were example messages to illustrate various aspects of each
attack type, as well as example messages to practice what was
learned. Various misconceptions (such as that people tend
to classify long URLs as Phishing links) identified from the
literature were addressed throughout the measure, too.
Customization. Before customization the measure was us-
able only for self-studies: it is full text PDF documents that
contains full sentences. This was not suitable for on-site tuto-
rials, thus it had to be adopted to be used in on-site tutorials
with Power Point presentations. Furthermore, Part-A (b), i.e.
the information that phishers may use various message media,
was not addressed in SOGSS’s version. The use of email on
mobile devices and/or social media is severely restricted to
a small number of SOGSS’s employees. Hence the tutorial
focused on desktop application emails, as they are the only
relevant target for phishers at SOGSS.
All examples from the original measure were replaced by
ones more related to the employees’ daily work. For example,
where possible, anonymised examples from reported phishing
emails were used. The PoC-InfoSecs were asked to show
one example after the other. For each example, they were
required to ask the audience whether it was a phish or not
and one person from the audience was to justify the answer.
Afterwards, the PoC-InfoSecs were supposed to explain the
correct answer and comment on the answers given by the
audience. This approach was used to attract the audience’s
attention. Finally, a summary of the most important findings
and recommendations to check for was included at the end of
the phishing part of the Power Point presentation.
4.4 Reminder Measures
Once the initial effect of the security awareness and education
programme on-site tutorial has worn off, a reminder measure
should be distributed to remind users of the information in
the programme. Due to the lack of research into these mea-
sures, the goals of this research project was first to identify
appropriate ones (i.e. by evaluating several). Correspondingly
the reminder measures described in this section are currently –
unlike the on-site tutorials– not part of the security awareness
and education programme. So far, only participants in the
corresponding study groups saw the reminder measures.
To the best of our knowledge, this aspect has not been stud-
ied in terms of which kind of presentation is most appropriate
in the information security field. Four different types of re-
minder measures were developed and then evaluated: a text
measure, a video measure, a interactive examples measure,
and a short text measure. To inform the development of the
reminder measures, we wanted to satisfy two requirements.
Firstly, the measure must stand for itself. Apart from the
shown measure, no further references or information should
be necessary In particular, no instructions or introductions
from another person should be required. Secondly, the mea-
sure content should match the on-site tutorial, i.e. it should not
contain any new content that does not represent previously-
learned knowledge from the on-site tutorial. The text and and
interactive examples measures contain exactly the same con-
tent (part A+B of the on-site tutorial). The video also covers
this same content, but presents it as a story in order to make it
more appealing. The short text cuts down the content to only
include part-B and minimised descriptions of the attacks and
defence strategies. In detail, the four reminder measures are:
Text: this measure is depicted in Figure 6 in the Appendix.
It is a text, in German, with six figures. These visualise ex-
planations such as the structure of URLs and that the actual
linked URL is displayed in a status bar or a tooltip.
Video measure: this measure presents the same content as
the previous one but relies mostly on visual explanations and
narration, instead of text. Figure 7 in the Appendix gives an
example of the video measure.
Interactive examples: this measure uses an interactive
presentation. The content is presented as two interactive ex-
amples of phishing emails (see Figure 8 in the Appendix).
Each of the emails has multiple interactivity-points marked
with red dots, which reveals information about the respective
part of the email when hovered over. In order to finish this
measure, the trainee has to click at least once on each area.
Short Text: this measure represents a text-based measure
with curtailed content compared to the previous measures. It
contains only Part-B, i.e. it focuses only on the recommen-
dations for detecting phishing messages (see Figure 9 in the
Appendix).
5 Methodology
We first introduce the research questions and the hypotheses.
Then, we discuss our study design decisions. Afterwards,
we provide details about the study, i.e. recruitment, group
assignment, used email examples, and actual study procedure
as well as ethical considerations.
5.1 Research Questions
We want to answer three research questions. The first one
is: How long does the effect of the on-site tutorial last,
i.e. when should the gained awareness and knowledge be
reminded?
The following pre-condition needs to hold: the measure
significantly strengthens participants’ skills in distinguishing
between phishing emails and legitimate emails, straight
after the on-site tutorial. Therefore we phrase the following
hypothesis for this pre-condition:
HMpre−M0M :Participants have an enhanced skill in
terms of distinguishing between phishing and legitimate
emails directly after the on-site tutorial, i.e. 0 months after it,
as compared to before participating in the on-site tutorial.
In order to investigate the effectiveness4 of the on-site
tutorial over time, we formulate the following hypothesis for
the continued testing:
HMpre−M∆t̄M :Participants have an enhanced skill in
terms of distinguishing between phishing and legitimate
emails after ∆t = 4 + 2i months, where i ∈ {0,1,2,3,4}, as
compared to before participating in the on-site tutorial.
We decided to start the follow-up evaluations after
four months due to results from related work in the phishing
context [22, 60, 116] reporting significant effects from
security awareness and education measures lasting from
45 days to up to five months. Therefore either 45 days or
five months after the on-site tutorial should be chosen for
the first follow-up evaluation. However, conducting the first
follow-up evaluation after 5 months would have increased
the likelihood that the effect of the on-site tutorial had
decreased below a significant improvement. Therefore, we
decided on a more conservative approach, i.e. to start the
follow-up evaluations earlier. Starting to early would have
required too many participant groups due to the between-
subjects approach. Therefore, we commenced the follow-up
evaluation after four months, since it represented the best
trade-off and allowed a meaningful study design despite
the limited overall number of participants available. Note
that the scheduled maximum duration of the evaluation was
set to twelve months due to legislative constraints5 of SOGSS.
The second research question is: Which of the four
reminder measures performs best – straight after its
roll-out?
The reminder measures were distributed as soon as
HMpre−M∆t̄M no longer held, i.e. after six months
6.
To study this second research question, the following
pre-condition needs to hold: the potentially best reminder
measure needs to significantly strengthen participants’ skills
in distinguishing between phishing emails and legitimate
emails - right after the reminder measure was rolled out.
Correspondingly, we use the following hypothesis:
4When we talk about effectiveness from now on, we only talk about the
effectiveness of the phishing part of the on-site tutorial.
5The next security awareness and education measure is required after one
year due to compliance reasons
6We analysed the data as soon as they arrived to distribute the reminder
measures as soon as the performance is no longer significantly better as
compared to before they participated in the on-site tutorial. As described
in Section D.1, our evaluation yields the result ∆t̄=6, i.e. the measurement
after six months did not detect a significantly enhanced skill in terms of
distinguishing between phishing and legitimate emails. We provide this
information here, to facilitate description of the remaining two research
questions.
HMpre−MReminderx−6M : Participants have an enhanced
skill to distinguish between phishing and legitimate
emails directly after the distribution of reminder measure
Reminderx ∈ {Text,Video, Interactive examples,Short Text},
as compared to before participating in the on-site tutorial.
For those reminder measures for which this pre-condition
holds, we compare the measured effects, to see one is more
superior than any others.
The third research question is: How long does the ef-
fect of reminder measures last? To measure this, we
evaluated the performances of those reminder measures for
which the precondition from the second research question
holds in a six month retention (i.e. 12 months after the
roll-out of the on-site tutorial). The corresponding hypothesis
is:
HMpre−MRemindery−12M : Participants still have an enhanced
skill to distinguish between phishing and legitimate emails
six months after distribution of the measure for which
HMpre−MReminderx−6M holds, compared to before participating
in the on-site tutorial.
This research question has two pre-conditions: (1)
participating twice (once after six months and again after
twelve months) should not have a significant impact on the
measured effect (2) other events in the organisation should
not lead to a significant improvement again.
5.2 Design Decisions for Study Design
The selection of the study type was driven by the need to
gain a high participation rate and outcome quality of the
study within the SOGSS environment. We decided on a study
design that would enable remote participation. This allowed
us to reach more participants than a lab study. Moreover,
remote participation was less time consuming for the SOGSS’
employees (being distributed over several locations and cities)
and it was less likely to interrupt their work as they could
participate during the allotted time frame at their convenience.
There are two main ways of conducting the evaluation
of the on-site tutorial with remote participation: a multiple
choice test, e.g. asking to define phishing and name attack
types; or evaluating participants’ actual skill to identify phish-
ing and legitimate emails. Multiple choice tests would have
provided very little information about the enhancement of
employees’ skills in terms of distinguishing phishing and
legitimate emails from each other as we would not be able
to determine whether emails’ other properties (e.g. the de-
ceptively trustworthy design or the sender name) may have
led them to judge phishing emails as legitimate (or the other
way round). We decided to employ the second option which
asked participants to classify emails as either phishing or
legitimate.
There are two main ways to evaluate participants’ actual
skills in terms of distinguishing between phishing and le-
gitimate emails: (i) sending them phishing emails (with or
without announcing the fact that phishing emails will be sent)
and then e.g. asking them to report phishing emails; or (ii)
displaying a set of emails in a survey style and asking them
to decide which were phish and which were legitimate. The
first option might be considered to be closer to assessing real
behaviour but such behaviour might well be influenced by the
fact that participants know they will receive phishing emails,
but they don’t know when they will receive them. Their daily
business remains their main task, not security, which is eco-
logically valid. In contrast, the second approach measures
skills in a ‘best case’ scenario as security is the participants’
primary goal in this case, and this is unrealistic.
However, the first approach – actually sending phishing
emails – was not feasible in our study setting at SOGSS.
Some reasons were: the research goal of assessing gained
awareness and knowledge over time required us to evaluate
all data in a very short time span for each group (i.e., for
each time ∆ti). To ensure that the received phishing emails
amount was realistic, we could not have sent more than one
test phishing email per day – but also not send one every day.
As the goal was to evaluate skills for all five attack types, this
evaluation have taken too long. Moreover, sending phishing
emails to employees of German organisations would have
required extra permissions e.g. from work councils. There
are also some general issues with this approach regarding
data collection quality (as e.g. discussed by [83]). For these
reasons, we employed the first approach – displaying email
screenshots in an online survey, where participants assessed
all emails in one session and decided, for each, whether it was
a phish or legitimate. This allowed us to evaluate all attack
types in the shortest possible amount of time.
5.3 Recruitment and Group Assignment
Due to SOGSS organisational requirements, participation in
the on-site tutorial was mandatory, but participating in the
evaluation was voluntary. The information about the evalua-
tion and a corresponding link to the survey was emailed to
employees by SOGSS’s CISM. Every group only got one
survey sent to them (we did not reuse groups/participants for
other groups). Once they received the notification to take part
in the survey, they had a week to do so. A reminder email was
sent that emphasised the importance of personal participation
due to the cyber security situation. This was sent to everyone
in the group as it was not known who had actually participated
as yet. We collected data for two weeks.
We planned for eleven groups (see Figure 1): seven reten-
tion groups and four reminder groups. For the assignment,
we considered the fact that besides the October on-site tuto-
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Figure 1: Overview of the participant sampling into the ten study groups, the measurements taken for each of the groups, and the
hypotheses in relation to the measurements used in the corresponding statistical tests. Group sizes marked with an ‘*’ are the
overall group size, not those participants used for the linked analyses (see Section 6.2). Group G10M (marked with ‘**’) was
originally scheduled and participants assigned to it, but due to the lack of significant effects in G6M and G8M the group was never
tested. The • indicates for each hypothesis in which measurement the participants are expected to perform better.
2019 to enable those employees who could not attend any of
the October options to participate. To prevent the introduc-
tion of variance into the later measurements, all participants
from these later tutorials were randomly assigned to either
Gpre or G0M . All other participants were randomly assigned
to one of the retention or reminder groups. Thereby, we en-
sured that participants from the same office were equally
distributed among all groups. Thus, participants from each
office were represented in each group. This was important
as employees were taught by different instructors at differ-
ent locations. Since it was a requirement of SOGSS, we did
not collect any demographic data in the study, and no other
parameters were used for the sampling. Every measurement
consisted of unique individuals except for the reminder mea-
surements at month 12 and the measurement at 12 months
for measuring participants twice. The numbers in Figure 1
reflect these unique participants. The linked participants are
a part of the full reminder measurements that we could link
based on a code they entered for the 6-month measurement
and the 12-month measurement. We will add this description
to section 5 to make the distinction clearer and earlier. For
GReminder−Interactive, GReminder−Text, GReminder−Video, and G6M ,
the measurement after 12 months is longitudinal.Therefore,
a subset of the overall participants from e.g. G_Reminder-
Interactive after 6 months build the corresponding group after
12 months. We denote those participants in each of the four
subsets as linked. The overall participants in each group after
6 months are called unmatched.
Note that all assignments were implemented by the CISM
for data protection reasons.
5.4 Email Screenshots
As outlined in Section 5.2, the participants’ performance was
measured using screenshots of emails, each of which has to
be classified as phish or legitimate. In an ideal setting, one
would have evaluated all combinations, relevant to SOGSS, of
five attack types (see Section 4.3), operating systems (includ-
ing at least Windows and macOS), email clients (including at
least Outlook, Thunderbird, Apple Mail), and web browsers
(including at least Firefox, Chrome, Safari). However, this
would have resulted in an infeasibly large number7 of screen-
shots that each participant would have needed to rate, leading
to fatigue effects or abandonment. Therefore, we selected a
representative subset of all possible screenshots. The goal was
to cover all attack types with a variability within the remain-
ing characteristics. (This resulted in ten different phishing
email screenshots. This set of phishing email screenshots was
complemented by an equal set of ten legitimate email screen-
7At least 180 = 5×2×3×3×2, assuming there are as many phishes as
legitimate emails.
Figure 2: The survey process and measurement times.
shots8. We decided to use ’https’ for all URLs (both phishing
and legitimate)9. The screenshots with a dangerous link were
generated in a way that the mouse was already situated next to
this link, i.e. the actual URL was displayed depending on the
environment in the tooltip or the status bar. The screenshots
of the phishing emails used in our evaluation are provided
in the supplementary material (see Figure 11 to Figure 15
in the appendix). The following phishing emails were used:
one easily to detected phishing email with implausible email
content: a dubious job offer, or an offer of unrealistic amounts
of money. Eight phishing emails with plausible content, but
including dangerous links: four emails presenting the URL in
the toolbar and four in the status bar; two with a mismatch and
one with a faked tooltip; URLs were either arbitrary, had the
domain name as subdomain, a typo in the domain, or the do-
main name was extended. One phishing email with plausible
email content, including a dangerous attachment.
5.5 Survey Design
The survey was designed to match the corporate design of
the organisation and it was implemented on the SoSci Survey
platform10. The overall structure is depicted in Figure 2.
For all measurements, after opening the corresponding
SoSci Survey link, participants received explanations about
the evaluation and the cooperation between their employer
(SOGSS) and our university for this evaluation. We tried to
mitigate external factors by also explaining that participants
ought not to use external sources (e.g. web search) and to
concentrate on the survey during the session. We tried to in-
crease participation by highlighting the possibility of using
this evaluation as a self-assessment of their own skills. More-
over, we assured the participants that they did not need to
fear consequences if they performed poorly. Thereafter, the
survey’s structure was explained to them. Participants were
informed that they could terminate their participation at any
time without providing any reason and that, in this case, their
8While this does not represent the usual ratio of phishing to legitimate
emails employees might find in their inboxes, it is appropriate for knowledge
assessments in particular to compare the performance against guessing
9The alternatives were either to use only http (which could have led to a
misleading message that dangerous links always use http and a conclusion
that https is always secure) or to combine each attack type applied with both
which would have lead to twice as many email screenshots.
10https://www.soscisurvey.de/
data would not be used (informed consent). Next, participants
from all groups except Gpre and G0M saw a page where they
were supposed to enter an individual self-selected code. This
code was necessary to permit us to link initial and subsequent
measurements (without violating anonymity).
Afterwards for the MReminder−x−6M the corresponding re-
minder measure was displayed with a short introduction of
what to expect on the page. The three measures were designed
to be similar: text, video and interactive examples required
the same amount of time (8 minutes). Short Text, which was
intentionally shorter, required 3 minutes to complete. Due to a
technical error interactive examples was also set to 3 minutes.
Next, all groups saw the same page again. We used a role
play approach. We told participants, before displaying the
screenshots, that they should assume that they are someone
called ‘Martin Müller’. Relevant details about Martin were
provided (see Appendix C). Then, the email screenshots were
shown in a random order, one per page. For each of the 20
screenshots, they had to decide whether it was a phish or le-
gitimate. At the end, participants had to answer a few control
questions such as their usage of the Internet or revising the
tutorial material. For the measurements after twelve months,
participants were also asked whether they had already partici-
pated after six months.
5.6 Ethics and Data Protection
Participation in the evaluation was optional and the survey
could have been completed at a time of the participant’s
choice. Participation was not remunerated in any way but
they could have participated during their working hours. Due
to strong privacy regulations in Germany, the anonymity of
participants was a mandatory requirement. Therefore, we used
SoSciSurvey to collect the data (they are compliant with the
new European Data Protection Regulation). The previously
described process to assign participants to groups, to invite
and to remind them, as well as the fact that no demographic
data was collected, was discussed with and approved by the
works council, as this prevented any kind of individual per-
formance monitoring. All information about the process, the
anonymity, the agreement of the works council, as well as
the fact that they did not need to fear consequences for poor
performance was provided to the participants in the invitation
email. It was also advised to get in touch with the CISM in
case of any ambiguity or questions about the received email.
6 Results
We first provide information about our participants and then
present the results for each of our three research questions.
6.1 Participants and Data Cleaning
A total of 439 participants completed the online survey (sev-
eral due to the two measure points for research question 2 and
3). We performed the following data cleansing steps: (1) We
excluded four participants whose answers evidenced specific
patterns. They had 100% phishing email identification and 0%
legitimate email identification respectively; i.e., they judged
all emails as phishing emails. (2) We excluded 26 participants
who admitted using the Internet or other sources to answer or
right before answering the questions. Thus, the data from 409
participants was analysed.
6.2 Analysis Methods
We used the Signal Detection Theory (SDT) [97] to measure
the participants’ performance, i.e. whether participants’ skills
in distinguishing between phishing and legitimate emails
improved, as compared to before the tutorial. This theory
has been used in other studies evaluating phishing identifi-
cation [14–19, 38, 75, 76, 79, 82, 93, 94]. SDT enables us to
discern between signal (phishing emails) and noise (legit-
imate emails). In line with above-mentioned literature, we
used the following two output values: sensitivity (d′) and cri-
terion (C). In the context of our research, sensitivity defined
the skill to distinguish phishing emails (signal) from legiti-
mate ones (noise). The larger d′, the better the participants’
performance in distinguishing signal from noise. Criterion
(C) was defined as the response tendency, e.g. in our case
whether participants were more cautious after the tutorial,
i.e. more legitimate emails were classified as phishing (more
false negatives), or did they take more risks, i.e. more phish-
ing emails are classified as legitimate (more false positives).
The closer this criterion was to 0, the more accurately they
decided whether a signal was phish or legitimate.
We evaluated the assumptions relevant for calculating SDT
parameters, i.e. equal variance and Gaussian distribution. Af-
terwards, we calculated the SDT parameters for sensitivity
and criterion per participant. We then calculated the mean
values per measurement using SPSS. To evaluate our hypothe-
ses, we analysed the differences for participants’ sensitivity
and criterion values using one-way ANOVAs (using SPSS).
ANOVA is a common tool to analyse forgetting curves as
it overcomes the problem of initial learning levels [44]. For
every ANOVA, we started off the analysis by checking the
assumptions for both the sensitivity and the criterion. Since
both sensitivity and criterion only violated the normal dis-
tribution assumption, and the ANOVA is relatively robust
against the violation of this assumptions [42], we continued
the analysis. For the descriptive results for the sensitivity see
Figure 3, 4, and 5. The hit-rates for phishes and legitimate
results are provided there as well. For simplicity and read-
ability reasons we will only state the significant results in the
following subsections (for full version see Appendix D).
Figure 3: Sensitivity score and hit rates (Phish/Legitimate)
for the measure of RQ1.
Figure 4: Sensitivity score and hit rates (Phish/Legitime) for
the measure of RQ2 (blue = only tutorial, green = reminder
measure groups).
6.3 Results for Research Question 1
As stated before, we analysed the data as soon as possible so
that we could distribute the reminder measure as soon as the
performance was no longer significantly better as compared
to their performance before they participated in the on-site
tutorial. We discovered that after a period of six months, per-
formance was no longer significantly different from before the
on-site tutorial. However, we decided to continue collecting
data after eight months to strengthen our findings. We wanted
to make sure that the difference between those two groups was
not due to variance of the participants in our between-subjects
design.
For the reporting of the results, we combine the analyses of
HMpre−M0M and HMpre−M∆t̄M (for ∆t = 4 + 2i months, where
i ∈ {0,1,2}) We checked for a significant difference between
the corresponding five groups (see Figure 1) using a one-
way ANOVA. There was statistical significance between the
groups (F(4,227) = 5.457, p < 0.001) for the sensitivity (d′).
For the effect size we calculatedω2 = .093, which is a medium
effect size according to [42]. A LSD post-hoc showed that
Figure 5: Sensitivity score and hit rates (Phish/Legitime) for
the measure of RQ3 (blue = only tutorial, green = reminder
measure groups).
the sensitivity for the M0M (d′ = 2.13, S D = 1.15) was signif-
icantly higher than for the Mpre (d′ = 1.11, S D = 1.12) with
(p < .001). The LSD post-hoc test showed that the sensitivity
for the M4M (d′ = 1.60, S D = 1.01) was significantly higher
than for the Mpre (d′ = 1.11, S D = 1.12) with (p = .034).
Note, there was no statistical significance between the groups
(p = 0.623) for the criterion (C).
In summary: We accept HMpre−0Month and HMpre−4Months.
6.4 Results for Research Question 2
First, we checked for which reminder measures the hypoth-
esis HMpre−MReminderx−6M holds. We checked for a signifi-
cant difference between Mpre and the four months reten-
tion groups (see Figure 1) using a one-way ANOVA. There
was statistical significance between the groups (F(5,244) =
2.410, p = 0.037) for the sensitivity (d′). For the effect
size we calculated ω2 = .027, which is a small effect size
[42]. A LSD post-hoc showed that the sensitivity for the
MReminder−Text−6M (d′ = 1.61, S D = 1.18) with (p = .005),
MReminder−Video−6M (d′ = 1.80, S D = 1.42) with (p = .005)
and MReminder−InteractiveExamples−6M (d′ = 1.73, S D = 1.19)
with (p = .007) were significantly higher than for the Mpre
(d′ = 1.11, S D = 1.12). Note, there was statistical signif-
icance between the groups (p = 0.013) for the criterion
(C). A LSD post-hoc showed that the criterion for the
MReminder−Text−6M (C = −.23, S D = .59) with (p = .043) and
MReminder−InteractiveExamples−6M (C = −.43, S D = .65) with
(p < .001) were significantly different from the Mpre (C = .12,
S D = .84).
In summary: We accept HMpre−MReminderx−6M for text measure,
video measure, and interactive examples measure.
In order to test whether one of the three remaining reminder
measures performs best, we also checked the ANOVA values
for between the reminder measures. There is no significant
difference between these measures. From the descriptive data,
the interactive examples measure performs slightly better than
the video measure (see Figure 5).
6.5 Results for Research Question 3
Based on the results from RQ2 we decided to not collect data
from the short text group after 12 months. In order to address
the pre-conditions from Section 5.1 we kind of extended
HMpre−MRemindery−12M accordingly, i.e. six measurements were
considered (see Figure 2).
We linked participants using the provided codes. This
resulted in 20 participants in M6M−12M , 17 participants in
MReminder−Text−12M , 17 participants in MReminder−Video−12M ,
and 12 participants in MReminder−InteractiveExamples−12M . We
analysed the data from participants that we could link via
code. We checked for a significant difference between the
corresponding six measurements. There was statistical signif-
icance between the groups (F(5,172) = 2.721, p = 0.022) for
the sensitivity (d′). The LSD post-hoc showed that the sensi-
tivity for the MReminder−Text−12M (d′ = 1.93, S D = 1.17) with
(p = .009), the MReminder−Video−12M (d′ = 1.77, S D = 1.32)
with (p = .031) and MReminder−InteractiveExamples−12M (d′ =
1.96, S D = 1.34) with (p = .016) were significantly higher
than for the Mpre (d′ = 1.11, S D = 1.12). For the effect size
we calculatedω2 = .047, which is a small effect size according
to [42]. Note, there was no statistical significance between
the measurements (p = 0.274) for the criterion (C).
In summary: The pre-conditions hold and we accept
HMpre−MRemindery−12M for video measure and interactive ex-
amples measure.
7 Discussion
We first discuss some general implications of our study, then
our results for the three research questions and then the limi-
tations of our work.
We excluded four participants because they marked all
screenshots in the survey as phishing emails and therefore
had 100% phishing detection but also 0% legitimate detection.
In addition, we excluded 26 participants for seeking help for
answering the survey. Seeking help is very useful in the real
world. But as we could not control what kind of help they
got and we explicitly mentioned that they should fill out the
survey without help, we decided to exclude those that violated
our rule.
We discussed advantages and disadvantages of publishing
the results with the organisation. In particular the potential
risk to the organization caused by publishing the results was
evaluated. Together with the organisation it was decided to
name a few key facts about the organization. We wanted to
give the opportunity to other researchers to know the study
setting in order to allow transferring the information to other
contexts and making sure that our results can be correctly
interpreted.
7.1 Discussion of RQ-1
The participants’ skills in identifying phishing messages im-
proved significantly straight after attending the tutorialsOur
results are in line with those of the study evaluating the effec-
tiveness of the original measure [84]. Thus, the customisation,
as well as the switch to an instructor-based tutorial approach,
seems not to have affected the efficacy of the content.
While the pre-condition for the first research question holds
and the phishing detection rate increased from 62% to 80%,
a closer inspection of the results begs the question whether
an 80% phishing identification rate in the M0M measurement
leaves the participants sufficiently protected, considering the
fact that security was their primary goal in our evaluation.
After some internal deliberation about these numbers, the im-
provements were seen as a success at SOGGS, since this was
the first organisation-wide security awareness and education
measure and employees skills in distinguishing legitimate
and phishing emails were significantly enhanced by the tuto-
rial. We will again deliver security awareness and education
measures at SOGGS with the goal of further increasing these
numbers.
With respect to the performance over time, we found that
after six and eight months participants’ skills were no longer
significantly better than before participating in the tutorial.
This also aligns with prior research reporting results of re-
tention tests, albeit all of these studies had shorter retention
periods. While they all used different interventions and also
different evaluation techniques, they all found that the effect
lasted until they conducted the retention study (which was
max. after 5 months in [22]).
Our results show that current reminder periods required by
standards such as PCI-DSS [27] – which usually require an
interval of twelve months – should be re-considered.
We are aware that the SOGGS has a higher age average,
as 60% of the employees are older than 50 years. One might
assume that we would have achieved different results with
younger participants. According to [44, 101] the age does not
increase the forgetting rate significantly. Therefore, we argue
that our results also hold true for younger people.
7.2 Discussion of RQ-2
Concerning the results for the reminder measures, both the
video measure and the interactive examples measure stand out
from the others in terms of sensitivity (1.797 and 1.728 versus
1.559 for the text measures after 6 months; and the text mea-
sure not being significantly better after 12 months compared
to the measurement before the tutorial). Thus, our results in-
dicate that – in line with related work such as [25, 67] – static
measures lead to a poorer performance than dynamic mea-
sures. Furthermore, our results show that even short reminder
measures can be very effective and it is neither necessary nor
recommended (because of the time needed) to use the main
security awareness and education measure as reminder mea-
sure. Yet, it must also be noted that there is a lower bound
to the information which must be included in the reminder
material, as evidenced by the insufficient performance of the
short text measure.
Overall, for SOGGS, the combination of costly on-site tuto-
rials and an efficient reminder measure after six months looks
very promising.
Whether the video measure or the interactive examples
measure perform better is not that easily answered as there
is no significant difference between the two. Considering the
criterion values, we could argue the video measure achieved
the best results. With respect to sensitivity, there is no clear
‘winner’ after 12 months. Note that although the performance
after 6 months for the video measure and interactive exam-
ples measure is not significantly lower than directly after the
on-site tutorial, the ultimate goal must be to get as close as
possible to the performance achieved directly after the tutorial
(see Figure 4).
7.3 Discussion of RQ-3
Following the discussion of RQ-1, the performance of par-
ticipants who received the video measure and the interactive
examples measure is so good that a refreshment might not
even be necessary after another six months has elapsed. Such
results should also be taken into account when reconsidering
time intervals of international standards, as discussed in Sec-
tion 7.1. In order to know when subsequent reminders should
be scheduled, future research into their long-term effects is
required.
7.4 Recommendations for Future Studies
We faced several challenges during our research. We discuss
here how they were addressed to assist researchers planning
similar studies - which we would welcome.
One challenge with our study was to avoid reporting an
effect for our reminder measures while the effect was actual
caused by external factors: e. g. media reports, or internal
discussions. This was addressed by including the 12 month
group and comparing their performance to those of the re-
minder groups.
The next challenge is that the exact point in time when we
measured the performance could not be controlled (also in
comparison to the participation in the tutorials which were
offered for an entire month). To address this, we limited the
time span for filling out the survey to two weeks after having
received the invitation email. Note that while this might be
an unusual design choice, this is reasonable in a field study
as not all employees would receive a security awareness and
education measure on the same day.
7.5 Limitations
Even though all instructors used the same measures and the
same instructions for conducting the tutorial, it is still possible
that there were small differences in the course of the held tuto-
rials.Some of these groups were trained by the CISM herself.
This limitation was mitigated by the random assignment of
employees from different locations to study groups.
Our study design selected measures for best case scenarios,
with security being the primary goal. We argue that it is worth
testing in such scenarios as it is a pre-condition for identifying
a phishing email during any working day. The results show
that this pre-condition is far from being a given (the Mpre only
detects 63% of the phishing emails). Furthermore, most of
the example emails could only be identified as such when the
URL behind the link and/or the file type were checked. Thus
the phishing emails used in the evaluation were more diffi-
cult to identify as compared to the average phishing emails
received by SOGSS employees. For the purpose of our re-
search, best case and poor performance before participating
in the tutorial, this approach is appropriate. We acknowledge
that for statements in the actual working environment with
actual received phishing emails, the study design would need
to be different.
In addition, due to the restrictions of SoSci Survey, we
could only provide screenshots, i.e. it was not necessary for
participants to move the mouse to the link as it was already
in the correct position, with the URL displayed. Furthermore,
it was not possible to check several of the integrated links
or get additional information such as the html source of the
email. Thus, on the one hand we made it a bit easier and
on the other hand a bit more difficult as compared to actual
phishing email detection. Thus, in reality, the detection rate
of the evaluated phishing emails is likely to be different if
employees would have received them in their inboxes and
were asked to judge them there. However, this would have
made a lab setting necessary, which was not possible.
In order to keep the duration of the study feasible, we were
restricted in the number of evaluated phishing emails. We
selected a representative sample of emails from the large
variety of possible options. It might be that different combi-
nations would have given us different results. However, we
believe that due to the selection of representative examples,
the findings would not have been significantly different.
Our study was customised for, and conducted at, a German
public sector organisation (SOGSS). Therefore, our partici-
pant sample is biased by the type of work and the technical
background of the employees. We would need to replicate our
study in other types of organisations and organisations with
different employee characteristics. This is part of future work.
Due to a technical error, the group interactive examples
had to spend only 3 minutes engaging with the material and
not 8 minutes as planned (similar to text and video). Even
though this meant that the participants spent less time with
the interactive examples measure than initially planned (about
7.3 minutes on average see Table 5 in the appendix), it still
produced excellent results. There is currently no evidence
to suggest that a more extended time spent with the ma-
terial would have had a negative effect. Since, despite the
aforementioned technical error, the measure achieved sig-
nificant results with both MReminder−InteractiveExamples−6M and
MReminder−InteractiveExamples−12M , one would expect either the
same or a better effect over a more extended period. Therefore,
we believe that this did not impact our results.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our results for phishing
hold although in the tutorial three topics were addressed (and
not just phishing). Thus, it might be that the effect would last
slightly longer if only one topic were addressed. It is open
to discussion which scenario is more realistic (a single topic
tutorial or one with some similar topics.
8 Conclusion
We presented a study on how effective security awareness
and education measures are over time, and what the best way
is to remind users’ awareness and knowledge. To this end,
we carried out a field investigation within a German “State
Office for Geoinformation and State Survey”. We considered
three research questions: i) How long does the effect of the
on-site tutorial last, i.e., when should the gained awareness
and knowledge be reminded?, ii) Which of the four developed
reminder measures performed best?, and iii) How long does
the effect of reminder measures last?.
From the almost 2000 employees, 409 voluntarily partici-
pated. From the fourth month after the on-site tutorial, we
evaluated groups every two months to measure awareness and
knowledge retention. After six months, we saw no improved
performance in distinguishing phishing and legitimate emails.
Four reminder measures were distributed to four groups (one
per group): a) text, b) video measure, c) interactive examples,
and d) a short text. Twelve months after the tutorial, we com-
pared the knowledge retention of the four reminder groups
with the the pre-group. Among the four reminder measures,
the video measure and the interactive examples measure per-
formed best, with their impact lasting at least six months after
being rolled-out.
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A Reminder Measures
Figure 6: Excerpt of the text reminder measure.
Figure 7: An impression of the video reminder measure.
Figure 8: One of the interactive example measure used. The
red dots represent the interactivity-points where participants
can reveal more information about the respective area of the
email.
Figure 9: The shortened text measure.
B Attack Types
(a) Phishers may try to trick recipients by display the legiti-
mate URL in the email’s message text (and hope that recip-
ients do not check the actual link destination). (b) Phishers
may try to trick recipients by ‘scipting’ a tooltip with the legit-
imate URL next to the link. (c) Phishers replace the legitimate
URL with a domain that they own (which has no connection
to the expected domain). They might adopt either the sub-
domain (e.g., https://www.amazon.com.phisher.com)
and/or the path so that the expected domain appears to allay
suspicions. (d) Phishers replace the legitimate URL by a link
to a domain that they own, and which looks very similar to
the expected one (e.g., arnazon.de). (e) Phishers replace the
legitimate URL by one with a domain they own, and which ex-
tends the expected domain name -– most likely a word before
or after the original name is added (e.g. amazon-secure.com).
C Study Scenario
D Result Related Information
Sensitivity (d’)
Mpre M0M M4M M6M M8M
1.11 2.13 1.60 1.45 1.39
Criterion (C)
0.12 −0.05 .0.09 −0.02 0.15
Table 1: SDT mean results for RQ1
Figure 10: Study details for role play (translated from German
for the purpose of this paper).
– Continued on next page –
D.1 Results for Research Question 1
For the reporting of the results, we combine the analyses of
HMpre−M0M and HMpre−M∆t̄M (for ∆t = 4 + 2i months, where
i ∈ {0,1,2})
We checked for a significant difference between the cor-
responding five groups (see Figure 1) using a one-way
ANOVA. There was statistical significance between the
groups (F(4,227) = 5.457, p < 0.001) for the sensitivity (d′).
For the effect size we calculatedω2 = .093, which is a medium
effect size according to [42]. A LSD post-hoc showed that
the sensitivity for the M0M (d′ = 2.13, S D = 1.15) was signif-
icantly higher than for the Mpre (d′ = 1.11, S D = 1.12) with
(p < .001).
The LSD post-hoc test showed that the sensitivity for the
M4M (d′ = 1.60, S D = 1.01) was significantly higher than
for the Mpre (d′ = 1.11, S D = 1.12) with (p = .034). But the
sensitivity for the M6M (d′ = 1.46, S D = 1.01) with (p = .123)
and for the M8M with (d′ = 1.39, S D = 1.42) with (p = .155)
was not significantly higher.
Note, there was no statistical significance between the
groups (p = 0.623) for the criterion (C).
In summary: We accept HMpre−0Month and HMpre−4Months.
D.2 Results for Research Question 2
First, we checked for which reminder measures the hypothesis
HMpre−MReminderx−6M holds.
We checked for a significant difference between Mpre and
the four months retention groups (see Figure 1) using a one-
way ANOVA. There was statistical significance between
the groups (F(5,244) = 2.410, p = 0.037) for the sensitiv-
ity (d′). For the effect size we calculated ω2 = .027, which
is a small effect size [42]. A LSD post-hoc showed that the
sensitivity for the MReminder−Text−6M (d′ = 1.61, S D = 1.18)
with (p = .005), MReminder−Video−6M (d′ = 1.80, S D = 1.42)
with (p = .005) and MReminder−InteractiveExamples−6M (d′ = 1.73,
S D = 1.19) with (p = .007) were significantly higher than
for the Mpre (d′ = 1.11, S D = 1.12). The sensitivity for
the MReminder−S hortText−6M was not significantly higher (d′ =
1.56, S D = 1.11) with (p = .075). Note, there was statisti-
cal significance between the groups (p = 0.013) for the cri-
terion (C). A LSD post-hoc showed that the criterion for
the MReminder−Text−6M (C = −.23, S D = .59) with (p = .043)
and MReminder−InteractiveExamples−6M (C =−.43, S D = .65) with
(p < .001) were significantly different from the Mpre (C =
.12, S D = .84). The criterion for the MReminder−S hortText−6M
(C = .03, S D = .77) with (p = .603) and MReminder−Video−6M
(C = −.06, S D = .70) with (p = .273) was not significantly
different.
In summary: We accept HMpre−MReminderx−6M for text mea-
sure, video measure, and interactive examples measure.
In order to test whether one of the three remaining reminder
measures performs best, we also checked the ANOVA values
for between the reminder measures. There is no significant
difference between these measures. From the descriptive data,
the interactive examples measure performs slightly better than
the video measure (see Figure 5).
D.3 Results for Research Question 3
Based on the results from RQ2 we decided to not collect data
from the short text group after 12 months. In order to address
the pre-conditions from Section 5.1 we kind of extended
HMpre−MRemindery−12M accordingly, i.e. six measurements were
considered (see Figure 2).
We linked participants using the provided codes. This
resulted in 20 participants in M6M−12M , 17 participants in
MReminder−Text−12M , 17 participants in MReminder−Video−12M ,
and 12 participants in MReminder−InteractiveExamples−12M .
We analysed the data from participants that we could link
via code. We checked for a significant difference between the
corresponding six measurements. There was statistical signif-
icance between the groups (F(5,172) = 2.721, p = 0.022) for
the sensitivity (d′). The LSD post-hoc showed that the sensi-
tivity for the MReminder−Text−12M (d′ = 1.93, S D = 1.17) with
(p = .009), the MReminder−Video−12M (d′ = 1.77, S D = 1.32)
with (p = .031) and MReminder−InteractiveExamples−12M (d′ =
1.96, S D = 1.34) with (p = .016) were significantly higher
than for the Mpre (d′ = 1.11, S D = 1.12). The sensitivity for
the M12M (d′ = 1.55, S D = 1.06) with (p = .060) was not sig-
nificantly higher. The sensitivity for the M6M−12M (d′ = 1.43,
S D = 0.77) with (p = .256) was not significantly higher. For
the effect size we calculated ω2 = .047, which is a small effect
size according to [42]. Note, there was no statistical signifi-
cance between the measurements (p = 0.274) for the criterion
(C).
Sensitivity (d’)
Mpre MReminder−Text−6M MReminder−Video−6M MReminder−InteractiveExamples−6M MReminder−S hortText−6M
1.11 1.61 1.73 1.80 1.56
Criterion (C)
0.12 −0.02 −0.23 −0.43 −0.06
Table 2: SDT mean results for RQ2
Sensitivity (d’)
Measure Mpre M12M M6M−12M MReminder−Text−12M MReminder−Video−12M MReminder−InteractiveExamples−12M
Linked 1.11 1.55 1.44 1.86 1.77 1.96
Unmatched 1.11 1.55 1.60 1.54 1.73 1.69
Criterion (C)
Linked 0.12 0.12 0.12 −0.07 −0.05 −0.38
Unmatched 0.12 0.12 0.01 −0.08 0.00 −0.02
Table 3: SDT mean results for RQ3
Measure M12M M6M−12M MReminder−Text−12M MReminder−Video−12M MReminder−InteractiveExamples−12M
Linked 36 20 17 17 12
Table 4: Number of participants per measure for linked and Unmatched groups
Minutes MReminder−Text−6M MReminder−Video−6M MReminder−InteractiveExamples−6M MReminder−S hortText−6M
Median 9.93 9.50 7.32 3.35
Std. Deviation 7.52 3.68 12.81 15.75
Table 5: The time needed by participants
E Email Screenshots of Phishes
Figure 11: Phishing email screenshots (part 1)
Figure 12: Phishing email screenshots (part 2)
Figure 13: Phishing email screenshots (part 3)
Figure 14: Phishing email screenshots (part 4)
Figure 15: Phishing email screenshots (part 5)
